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Nature’s Capacities: Schelling and Contemporary 
Power-Based Ontologies1 
 
Contemporary metaphysics is seeing a resurgence of interest in the concept 
of power.  This concept is being applied to a range of debates: there has been 
much work on using powers to account for causation; on properties as powers; 
and a growing interest in powers-based accounts of free will.  However, 
despite this range of applications for the concept of power, a distinct lack of 
work exists focussing on extending this concept to ontology as a whole – on 
answering the question ‘can there be a world of powers only?’2 This lack of 
investigation into what a power-based ontology would look like raises a 
number of questions for accounts which use powers: if properties are powers, 
what is the nature of the objects which possess these properties?  Do powers 
make up objects?  If not, how do powers interact with whatever objects are 
composed of?  Is an ontology which posits powers as the fundamental 
ontological unit viable?  What would the advantages and pitfalls of this kind of 
view be?   
I want to argue that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie provides an ontology 
which helps to answer these questions.  In this paper I defend two main 
claims: firstly, that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is best understood as a 
powers-based system, where nature is understood as composed of powers in 
process, all the way down.  My argument for this supports my second claim: 
that Schelling’s work is useful for metaphysicians interested in what a power-
based ontology would look like; its implications; its benefits; and its potential 
pitfalls. Because of the centrality of powers to the Naturphilosophie, and 
because of the holistic nature of Schelling’s work, the role of powers and 
relationship of powers to a range of other concepts is carefully specified.  Thus 
a number of the implications and advantages of this view are already worked 
out and presented in the texts on Naturphilosophie. 
I begin with a brief outline of the characterisation and use of powers in the 
contemporary literature, to show the marked similarities between these 
accounts and Schelling’s.  I then present my reading of the Naturphilosophie 
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as a power-based ontology, and gesture towards some ways that this account 
could help to fill some of the gaps in the current literature.  Finally, I argue 
that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie also demonstrates some possible problems 
that will arise for any ontology of this kind. 
 
1. Powers in Contemporary Metaphysics 
Although there are a number of competing accounts of powers in the 
literature (which differ in their characterisation of the ontological status of 
powers), there are certain features regarding the nature of powers which are 
common to all accounts.  Firstly, the terms power and disposition are 
generally used interchangeably.  A power is thus understood as a disposition, 
a property of an object which disposes that object to behave in a particular 
way:  
Powers are properties like fragility and electric charge, whose possession 
disposes their bearer in a certain way.  The instantiation of fragility in 
the glass disposes the glass to break if struck in appropriate 
circumstances.3   
 
The specific behaviour which a power disposes its bearer towards is called a 
manifestation: the power of fragility in the glass is manifested when the glass 
breaks.  Therefore powers are fundamentally directional by nature: a 
particular power is directed towards a particular manifestation or set of 
manifestations – the power of fragility disposes its bearer to break when 
struck; the power of elasticity disposes its bearer to stretch, bounce, or be 
flexible, given the appropriate conditions.   
The example of fragility makes explicit a further aspect of the nature of 
powers: they can be possessed by an object whether or not they are ever 
manifested, just as the glass remains fragile even if it never breaks.  Thus 
although a manifestation is ontologically dependent on the power, the power 
is ontologically independent of its manifestation and continues to exist even 
when the manifestation is not and never will be present:   
The occurrence of the manifestation of a power depends on the existence 
of the power, but not vice versa.  Powers can exist in the absence of their 
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manifestations and so are ontologically independent of their 
manifestations.4   
 
This example draws attention to another feature of the nature of powers: 
they are intrinsic properties of the objects which bear them; 
Things and materials have powers even when they are not exercising 
them, and that is a current fact about them, a way in which they are 
currently differentiated from other things […] The difference between 
something which has the power to behave in a certain way and 
something which does not have that power is not a difference between 
what they will do, since it is contingently the case that their powers are, 
in fact, ever exercised, but it is a difference in what they themselves are.  
It is a difference in intrinsic nature.5     
 
To ascribe a disposition to an object is to make a claim about that object’s 
nature, and to claim that when a particular phenomenon occurs it is the 
natures of the objects or materials involved that are responsible for its 
occurrence.  Powers should therefore be understood as immanent to the 
objects which bear them, as the dispositions that they confer on objects are an 
essential part of those objects’ natures. 
As I mentioned above, in the literature there are a variety of different 
positions on the ontological status of powers: here I will be focusing on those 
which claim that dispositional properties are fundamental, and therefore that 
any other properties of objects are reducible to their dispositional properties.  
This class of views (referred to as dispositional monism or pan-
dispositionalism6) will be my focus because it is most similar to the kind of 
position which posits powers as the fundamental ontological constituent that I 
take Schelling to be advancing in the Naturphilosophie. 
 
1.1 Dispositional Monism: Powers as Properties 
Dispositional monism is defined by Mumford as:  ‘The ontological thesis 
that there is only one fundamental type of property.  All properties are 
dispositional properties; categorical properties do not exist.’7  And by Molnar, 
who prefers the term pan-dispositionalism, as: ‘an ontological position 
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according to which every genuine property (on a sparse theory of properties) 
is a power, and the same is true of every genuine (unfounded) relation.’8  This 
position claims that dispositional properties are the fundamental properties of 
objects, and any other properties of objects are ontologically dependent on 
these dispositional properties.  
This account will characterise powers as having similar features to those 
outlined in section 1 above, with a few additions.  Taking my cue from Molnar 
I identify five central characteristics of powers on a pan-dispositionalist 
account: 
1. Directionality - ‘A power has directionality, in the sense that it must be a 
power for, or to, some outcome.’9  As outlined above, powers are inherently 
directional, in that they are always directed towards a particular manifestation 
or set of manifestations.  Molnar argues that because of their directional 
natures powers should be understood as intentional, as they are always 
directed towards something beyond themselves: their manifestation is thus 
their intentional object.10  This intentionality is different to simply having a 
direction as the power is always directed towards one or a set of specific 
manifestations. The characterisation of powers as intentional has strong 
parallels to Schelling’s account, where powers are to an extent to be thought of 
in the same terms as subjective activity.  This directedness of powers ensures 
both the inherent activity of powers and the fact that there must be more than 
one power in the system, as powers must have something outside of 
themselves to be directed towards.   
2.  Independence.   The independence thesis refers to the fact that powers 
are ontologically independent of their manifestations – although the 
manifestation is ontologically dependent on the power, the power continues to 
exist even if the manifestation is never present.  This does not mean that there 
is no necessary connection between a power and its manifestation (this 
connection is always present due to the intentionality of powers, the fact that 
they are always powers for something), just that the existence of the 
manifestation is not necessary for the existence of the power. 
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3. Actuality.  The actuality criterion is tied to the independence thesis, and 
claims that powers are fully actual properties of their bearers.  Thus powers 
are not simply potentialities for given manifestations; they are actual 
properties of their bearers which exist independently of any given 
manifestation.   
4. Objectivity.  The objectivity thesis is sometimes referred to as the mind-
independence thesis, as it claims that powers have a real objective existence in 
the world and are not dependent in any way on the activity of minds.  This 
(coupled with the actuality criterion) gives rise to a conception of objects as 
having real and irreducible causal powers which exist objectively. 
5. Intrinsicality.  Finally, Molnar argues that powers are intrinsic properties 
of their bearers: they are an essential aspect of the nature of their bearers and 
do not depend on contingent relationships with other objects or powers.  
However, following Bostock11 I would like to claim that although most powers 
are intrinsic to objects in this way there are also powers which should be 
thought of as extrinsic: as conferred on objects by virtue of particular 
contingent relationships to other objects.  Allowing extrinsic powers means 
that properties such as spatial location and spatial relations to other objects 
(which are clearly not intrinsic properties) can be conceived as dispositional.  
Because these properties can be causally relevant it seems fair to consider 
them as dispositional, and this allows the pan-dispositionalist to dispense 
with the idea that she needs to allow the existence of categorical properties 
(such as Molnar’s ‘S-properties’) in her ontology.   
One of the regress objections to dispositional monism regards the question 
of how the nature of a power is fixed12 – as power’s nature becomes 
determinate by virtue of its possible manifestations (i.e. its relations to other 
objects) it seems that powers can only be determined relationally, which 
appears to lead to a regress as each power always owes its nature to another, 
which owes its nature to another, and so forth.  One response to this 
objection13 is to argue that there is a circularity in the determination of the 
nature of powers, but that this circularity is not vicious.  Rather, the natures of 
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powers are fixed collectively in terms of their place within a system of powers, 
a web of mutually determining relations.  Williams likens this to semantic 
holism, which claims that the specific determinate meaning of a word in a 
given language depends on the specific determinate meaning of the other 
words with which it is arranged in a whole system.14  That the words need the 
system, as well as the other words within the system, in order to fix their 
identity is not seen as problematic, therefore we should not find it problematic 
that the nature of powers are fixed in a similar way. 
These considerations indicate that a power-based ontology will necessarily 
be holistic – powers get their identities fixed by their relations to other powers 
within a holistic network:   
A property cannot stand alone, unaffected by and unconnected with 
anything else.  A world comes with a whole connected system of 
properties […] The properties that are real in a world must, therefore, 
form an interconnected web: a system with no property standing alone 
or outside.15   
 
Mumford argues that this holistic conception of properties (understood as 
powers) fits with our intuitive understanding of properties: we cannot 
conceive of how a property that was not a member of such a web could be a 
property at all, as it would be unable to have effects on anything and would 
therefore be unable to have any fixed determinate identity.  This account of 
the holism entailed by pan-dispositionalism again bears striking similarities to 
Schelling’s view: in the Naturphilosophie the powers which constitute nature 
form an interconnected whole; and it is this whole which grounds their 
natures and their interactions. 
 
1.2 Causal Powers 
In addition to accounts which posit powers as properties, there are also a 
number of views which put powers at the centre of conceptions of causality.16  
Power-based accounts of causation claim that objects have particular causal 
powers and that it is these powers which are responsible for causing change in 
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that object or in the world.  This view therefore sees objects as intrinsically 
causally active: objects bear particular dispositional properties and it is the 
activity of these properties which leads to causal change in the world.   
Causal powers thus spring from the basic natures of objects: objects have 
particular properties and it is these properties which dispose them to behave 
in certain ways in particular circumstances: 
[W]ithin this view one may see [the behaviour of objects] as flowing from 
their natures as constitutions or consequences of what they are […] 
Being of the right nature endows a thing or material with the power to 
manifest itself in certain ways or to behave in certain ways in the 
appropriate circumstances.17    
 
A power-based account of causation sees causality in terms of manifesting 
dispositions: an object has particular dispositional properties and a tendency 
to manifest these properties given particular external circumstances or 
stimuli,18 and it is this manifestation which leads to change in the world.  The 
dispositional properties of objects therefore fix which causal roles these 
objects are able to play: as a dispositional property is always directed towards 
a particular manifestation or set of manifestations, an object which has that 
dispositional property bears the causal powers to bring about that particular 
manifestation.   
The account of causation as dispositional implies a reciprocal relationship 
between the objects involved in causal relations, as it will take two objects 
manifesting complimentary powers in order to produce an effect.  In order to 
smash a glass it is not enough to have a glass which has the power of fragility 
(i.e. a disposition to break): one must also be in possession of an object which 
has the power to break things; and it will take these two objects manifesting 
their powers together in order that the effect (the glass smashing) occurs.  
This indicates that the conception of the relationship between causes and 
effects on a power-based account is different from traditional accounts which 
see causes as fully active and effects as merely passive: a dispositional account 
of causality conceives of effects as arising from interactions between objects 
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which are both equally active members of the causal process.  Again, this view 
bears striking similarity to the Naturphilsophie’s account of causation, which I 
outline below. 
 
1.3 Gaps in the Current Literature 
So far I have presented two of the most common uses of the concept of 
power in contemporary metaphysics: an account of properties as powers 
(dispositional monism); and an account of causation as depending on these 
powerful properties of objects.  These positions are separable: one might 
argue for a power-based understanding of causation, while still maintaining 
that dispositional properties are in some sense reducible to other properties of 
objects.  However, the strongest version of these views will argue that all 
properties are powers, and therefore that we should understand other features 
of the natural world, such as causation and natural laws19, in terms of the 
interactions of these powers.   
Despite this strong realism about powers, there is very little engagement in 
the literature with the question of just how fundamental powers are: if 
properties are powers, then what is the relationship between these powers and 
the objects which bear them?  Are objects composed of these powers?  If 
powers are playing such a vital role in our ontology, does it make sense to 
conceive of powers as the fundamental ontological unit?  What would an 
account of reality of this kind look like?   
I now want to argue that Schelling’s work can help shed light on these 
questions: as I will demonstrate, his Naturphilosophie advocates the kind of 
strong realism about powers which has so far been largely undiscussed in the 
literature.  For Schelling, powers are more than just certain properties which 
objects have, but are themselves the fundamental ontological constituents.  In 
the Naturphilosophie, the answer to the question: ‘Of what does reality, at the 
basic level, consist?’ will be powers, all the way down.  This account therefore 
holds that all natural objects as well as properties are ontologically dependent 
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on fundamental natural powers.20  Schelling’s work is therefore instructive in 
terms of answering the questions that the current literature leaves 
unanswered: the Naturphilosophie provides a unified conception of nature as 
dependent on the activities of fundamental powers in process.  In addition, 
Schelling provides an account of how we can make sense of causation, the 
constitution of objects, and the continuity between human agency and natural 
causality using this power-based ontology.  Thus looking at Schelling’s work 
can enable us to make sense of the viability of this kind of view, and to 
investigate any potential problems which it entails.   
 
2. Powers in the Naturphilosophie 
 
Before outlining Schelling’s Naturphilosophie I want to say something 
briefly about the motivations for this view, and the striking similarity that it 
bears to contemporary motivations for adopting dispositional monism.  
Arguably, the resurgence of interest in the concept of power is due to a 
rejection of the Humean paradigm in metaphysics: this paradigm provides a 
picture of the world as composed of disconnected objects with no connections 
between them; and renders objects inherently passive as any causal activity is 
explained by something external to those objects.  The power-based picture, 
however, sees objects as fundamentally active: properties and causal activities 
stem from the nature of objects themselves.  It also accounts for the 
connectedness of natural objects due to the holism about properties that I 
outlined above.  A further advantage of this view is that it avoids the need to 
evoke anything over and above objects and their natures in order to explain 
their activity: although the Humean picture might be thought of as 
metaphysically minimal it in fact necessitates the addition of natural laws 
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(understood as entities which are external to objects and necessitate their 
behaviour, thus giving the illusion of connections in the natural world) which 
stand over and above objects.  The power-based account has no need to rely 
on these mysterious laws which exist separately to natural objects, as laws as 
well as properties and causal powers are understood on the basis of the 
dispositions of objects.   This is a central advantage of this kind of view: it is 
able to account for natural connections as well as the causal activity of objects 
without appealing to anything over and above nature in order to do so. 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is motivated by a set of similar concerns, as 
demonstrated by his critique of mechanistic accounts of nature.  This critique 
rests on the claim that the mechanistic paradigm is unable to account for 
certain aspects of nature: not only subjectivity and freedom; but also the 
purposive aspects of natural organisms and the interconnection of nature as a 
whole.  Although I will not be able to discuss Schelling’s central critiques of 
mechanistic thought in detail here, I want to briefly mention them to further 
demonstrate the closeness of this line of reasoning to the contemporary 
rejection of Humean accounts of nature.  Schelling’s critique of mechanism 
focuses on three central areas: the mechanistic account of matter (which fails 
because it entails a picture of matter as static, inert, and requiring some 
external power to confer properties on it and explain its causal activity); the 
mechanistic conception of causality (which fails because it assumes that all 
causation is purely efficient, and consists in a fully active cause necessitating a 
fully passive effect); and finally the inability of mechanism to account for the 
nature of organisms (due to its picture of objects and nature, the mechanist is 
incapable of accounting for organisms on the same terms that it accounts for 
other natural objects).    Further, one of Schelling’s central criticisms of 
mechanism as a whole mirrors the critique of Humeanism discussed above: 
although these views of nature take themselves to be making minimal 
metaphysical commitments, due to their impoverished conceptions of objects 
and nature they in fact have to appeal to some explanatory principle over and 
above natural objects in order to explain their activity, rather than explaining 
this from within the natural. 
********************************************** 
The first maxim of Naturphilosophie is therefore that nature must be 
treated as an autonomous, unconditioned, mind-independent and self-
sufficient realm: the philosopher of nature should start from this basic 
assumption, and explain all phenomena in terms of purely natural powers: 
‘[t]he first maxim of all true natural science, to explain everything by the 
forces of nature, is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science.’21  As 
I will demonstrate, one of the central claims of Naturphilosophie is that 
reality, at the fundamental level, is composed of powers.  These powers are 
both real and non-reducible, and produce the concrete objects which we 
experience in our day-to-day interactions with the natural world: ‘force is the 
ultimate […] to which all our physical explanations must return.’22   
 
2.1 The Absolute as Power 
 For Schelling, investigations of nature inevitably lead us to:  
[A] common principle in which, fluctuating between organic and 
inorganic nature, is contained the first cause of all change in the former 
and the final ground of all activity in the latter.  Because this principle is 
everywhere present, it is nowhere; because it is everything, it cannot be 
anything determinate or particular.23  
 
This principle is what Schelling refers to as the absolute: the absolute is the 
fundamental principle which grounds all natural products; it is neither 
subjective nor objective but is the primordial indifference point which 
subtends all distinction and differentiation.  The absolute is both the basis of 
all things and the totality of all things; it makes possible variety as well as 
interaction; and grounds both universality and particularity.  It is the infinite 
unified whole which constitutes and encompasses all being, and the ground of 
all finitude and differentiation.   If, however, reality consists in this universal 
undifferentiated whole, the question arises of how and why the world of our 
experience becomes differentiated: why does the world consist of a myriad of 
distinct individuals if it is the manifestation of an undifferentiated whole? 
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Schelling is able to make sense of this question because, on my reading, the 
absolute itself is a power. Schelling frequently describes the absolute as 
primordial will or eternal act, and I suggest it is this which necessitates that 
the absolute goes beyond itself and creates a world.  The language of will and 
act indicates that the absolute is best thought of in dispositional terms: the 
absolute is a power, and as such it is always directed towards something 
beyond itself – its manifestation as nature.  The absolute ‘is itself this eternal 
activity, since it belongs to its idea that immediately through its concept it 
should also be, that its essence should also be form for it, and the form 
essence.’24  The nature of the absolute is such that it demands to be 
manifested: the reason that there is something rather than nothing is that the 
nature of reality is dispositional; the absolute is a power which strives to 
manifest its essence in form.  
As undifferentiated whole the absolute cannot concretely exist: it can only 
actualise itself through concrete particulars.  This necessitates that the 
undifferentiated absolute has to divide, to introduce differentiation within 
itself in order to give rise to distinct entities.25  Schelling characterises this 
differentiation in a number of ways: the absolute divides into essence and 
form; universal and particular; ideal and real; subject and object; productivity 
and product; productivity and limitation. The crucial aspect of all of these 
distinctions is that both terms are mutually dependent.  For example, the 
infinite productivity of the absolute and the finite product which constitutes 
nature both require one another: if nature was purely product, the conditions 
of its productivity would lie outside it, which would mean invoking a 
transcendent entity and an extrinsic purpose, both of which Schelling is 
committed to denying.  Thus the ground of nature’s productivity must lie 
within it: productivity and product must be united if nature is to be an 
autonomous self-sufficient realm.  Similarly, without finite products to 
express itself in and oppose itself to the infinite productivity of nature would 
come to nothing, would never be actualised.   
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This structure of opposing but mutually dependent powers which are 
united as two aspects of the same process is central to Schelling’s conception 
of nature, and his conception of natural beings.  For Schelling, all natural 
beings reflect the basic activity of the absolute of which they are 
manifestations: beings are products of the interactions of opposed but 
mutually dependent powers, which are unified in nature as a whole.  This 
highlights the centrality of powers to Schelling’s account: the absolute is 
primordial will or power which actualises itself through the interactions of its 
two basic tendencies or powers; this process is then repeated throughout 
nature whereby natural powers interact to produce different natural products.   
 
2.2 The Actualisation of the Absolute 
Although the absolute as productive and the absolute as product (nature) 
are inseparable, Schelling argues that we can nonetheless reconstruct the 
process through which the absolute actualises itself in the natural world.  To 
refer to this as a process is misleading as the term process implies a temporal 
sequence of stages, when in the case of the absolute giving rise to nature these 
‘stages’ are inseparable, mutually dependent, and do not take place in any 
temporal order.  For this reason it is more apt to refer to them as aspects, 
where these aspects are simultaneous and presuppose one another: Schelling 
argues that the third aspect is only conceivable in relation to the first two and, 
conversely, that these first two only become possible in relation to the third.26  
These three aspects constitute three different unities (with Schelling 
characterising the absolute as the unity of all three unities): the first unity 
expresses the transition of essence into form, the infinite embodied in 
finitude, and characterises the manifestation of the absolute in its concrete 
form as material nature.  The first unity necessitates the second, which is the 
transition of form into essence, the finite embodied in the infinite, and is 
constituted by the arising of the subjective in nature in the form of light.  The 
third embodies the unity of the first two, but unites them as distinct: they 
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retain their difference within this final unity.27  Schelling describes these 
aspects as the real unity, the ideal unity, and the unity of real and ideal.28 
This dynamic sequence is repeated throughout nature, and through this 
three-fold process different natural products arise.  Nature’s forces are a 
reflection of the fundamental powers which constitute the activity of the 
absolute: a positive tendency for infinite productivity which constitutes a 
continual movement and striving forward; limited by a negative force which 
strives to turn the productive force back on itself; and finally the two forces 
are unified (as distinct) in particular products.  It is the interaction of these 
forces at different levels of nature which drives nature’s productivity and 
structures the development of natural products. 
The organising activity of nature’s basic forces constitutes a continual 
process which necessarily extends to infinity; if everything that exists is a 
manifestation of the absolute we must conclude that: 
[B]eing itself is nothing other than the constructing itself, or since 
construction is thinkable only through activity, being itself is nothing 
other than the highest constructing activity, which, although never itself 
an object, is the principle of everything objective.29   
 
As the absolute is by nature a productive power, it follows that its activity will 
not reach a conclusion until it has fully realised its nature in its product (or, to 
borrow the language of contemporary dispositonalism, until it has realized all 
of its possible manifestations).  Thus the absolute continually strives to 
manifest itself in a product which expresses the universal, in a form which 
wholly exemplifies its essence.  However, the absolute can only produce finite 
products which are therefore incapable of expressing its nature: as the 
absolute is infinite its activity could never be exhibited in a finite product but 
only in an infinite one.30  This entails that nature is an infinite process: the 
productive tendency of the absolute continually attempts to create an infinite 
product, however as all products involve limitation it can only produce the 
finite.   
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It is because of the infinite productivity of nature that Schelling states: ‘the 
chief problem for the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in 
nature, […] but the resting, permanent.’31 As we have seen, products arise 
from nature’s infinite productivity due to nature’s opposing but mutually 
dependent disposition to limitation: products arise when productivity is 
limited by an opposing power; and natural products are the result of the 
mutual manifestation of these two powers.   
Because natural products are manifestations of a productive power as well 
as a limiting power, Schelling argues that they all contain the potential for 
development and activity: rather than being static, natural objects are 
‘permanent processes’32 which express the continual activity of the powers 
which constitute them in their own self-maintenance and preservation.  The 
central point here is that for the Naturphilosophie,  
[T]he main objects of investigation are dynamical forces or productivity, 
not static objects or products.  The static object is always secondary with 
respect to the forces and powers that generate and maintain it.33 
 
Natural products are therefore better seen as stable manifestations of 
power relations, on this view, than discrete concrete objects. This is one of 
the reasons that Schelling’s ontology in the Naturphilosophie gives us a 
picture of nature as fundamentally interconnected – the difference between 
one object and another is not constituted by an absolute boundary, as 
objects (stable processes) are connected by virtue of being parts of a larger 
process.  However, this also leads to one of the problems which I will raise 
for power-based views below.  
 
2.3 Powers and Matter  
The process through which natural objects arise from the interactions of the 
same basic forces is most clearly seen in Schelling’s account of the 
construction of matter.  Schelling provides a number of arguments against the 
Newtonian conception of matter, concluding that the Newtonian account in 
fact demonstrates that the concept of force is more fundamental than that of 
matter: rather than matter coming first and forces somehow being implanted 
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afterwards, force must instead be the ground of matter.  Force is central to the 
Newtonian account as it is necessary to explain motion and interaction: 
without the concept of force, the Newtonian is left with an ontology of static 
discrete substances which radically contradicts our experience of the world.   
If matter is conceived as inherently inert, forces cannot be explained on the 
basis of matter.  However, Schelling argues, matter can be explained on the 
basis of forces, and therefore we should take force to be the more fundamental 
of the two.  Thus, Schelling concludes: ‘Matter and bodies, therefore, are 
themselves nothing but products of opposing forces, or rather, are themselves 
nothing else but these forces.’34   
The Newtonian is right to maintain that matter consists in occupying space, 
but Schelling argues that matter in fact fills up space – matter is able to 
occupy space only by virtue of being inherently active: ‘What IS in space is in 
space by means of a continually active filling up of space; therefore, in every 
part of space there is moving force’.35  In order to account for matter’s ability 
to fill space, it is necessary to posit a positive force; a power which expands 
ensuring that no other object is able to fill the same point in space.  However, 
Schelling argues that if matter were composed of this power alone it would 
continue to expand outwards to infinity, filling all space.  If this were the case 
matter would in a sense be everything and nothing: there would be no 
determinate quantity of matter at any particular point in space; matter would 
be everywhere and therefore nowhere.  Thus it is necessary for us to posit an 
opposing power which limits the activity of the positive power, restricting its 
activity to a determinate position.  Again, this force alone cannot constitute 
the essence of matter, as if matter were composed of just this power its 
attempts to limit would result in its imploding into a single point; again 
matter would in a sense be nothing.   
This is a difficult set of thoughts to grasp, and is perhaps best thought of in 
terms of limits: matter must include the power to fill space (in order for it to 
exist at all it must be capable of extending itself in space and preventing other 
objects from occupying the same space); however this power needs to be 
limited in order that matter can be a determinate quantity.  The attractive or 
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force is therefore necessary to provide a boundary which binds the expansive 
force to a determinate point, forming matter in space.  Thus Schelling argues 
that: 
[R]epulsive force without attractive force is formless; attractive force 
without repulsive force has no object.  […T]he object is never without its 
limit, or matter without its form.  The two may be separated in 
reflection; to think of them as separated in reality is absurd.36  
 
This makes explicit the sense in which the construction of matter reflects 
the original activity of the absolute: both require the interaction of two 
opposed but mutually dependent powers interacting within a wider unity.37  
The positive and negative powers which manifest together to give rise to 
matter thus correspond to the original powers of productivity and 
limitation in the absolute.   
Schelling concludes that ‘no matter is, or can be, anything but forces 
attracting and repelling through action and reaction.’38  Matter itself, and all 
of its properties, depends on the nature of the fundamental forces which 
constitute it: ‘all quality of matter rests whole and solely on the intensity of 
its basic forces.’39  
 
2.4 Powers and the Genesis of Objects 
Schelling’s account of the construction of matter from the fundamental 
forces of nature is reflected in his account of the emergence of organic from 
inorganic nature.  The process through which matter arises is repeated at 
increasing degrees of complexity giving rise to electricity, chemical systems, 
magnetism, and so on up through the levels of inorganic nature until the 
organism is produced.  This process then continues to repeat at the level of 
organic nature, giving rise to more and more complex organisms until reason 
and self-consciousness emerge at the level of the rational subject.  Different 
natural beings thus differ only in terms of the combination and concentration 
of the forces which constitute them:  
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[T]he identity of a material is ascertained only by the permanence of its 
qualities, its identity in no way differs from the latter; every material is 
thus nothing other than a determinate degree of action.40 
 
This helps shed light on Schelling’s earlier claim that all natural products are 
simply processes: as all natural products are composed of varying degrees of 
forces these products are nothing more than the continual process of 
interaction of these forces.  Qualitative differences between objects rest simply 
on differences in dynamic process: all natural objects are dynamic processes; 
different objects arise from different quantities and combinations of powers, 
and this accounts for their different qualities.   
A second important point arising from Schelling’s argument that all natural 
objects are composed of varying degrees of forces is that this further supports 
his claim that all of nature constitutes a single active system, and thus that 
there is no essential differentiation between different levels of nature and 
natural products.  For Schelling, as each potency synthesises the forces 
present in the lower potency, nature constitutes more and more complex 
forms of the same basic process:  
What is implicit, inchoate, and disparate on a lower level or potency 
becomes explicit, organised, and unified on the higher one.  Since a 
higher potency unifies the factors of a lower potency, it reproduces them 
and so is not completely distinct from them.41  
 
This unity of different natural products, and the claim that higher potencies 
arise from lower potencies, means that we can consider Schelling as an 
emergentist: claiming that certain natural products are emergent phenomena 
which arise from other natural products.  This claim, that there is no essential 
differentiation between different levels of nature, will fall out of any ontology 
which posits powers as the fundamental ontological constituent, as powers are 
present and constitutive of objects at every level.  Again, although this is in 
one sense a significant advantage of this kind of view (as it gives us a way to 
account for the unity of natural products), it also entails one of its downfalls, 
which I return to later.   
 
2.5 Powers and Causation  
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Schelling’s claim that all natural products are composed of the powers 
which characterise nature as a whole informs his conception of causation as a 
fundamentally reciprocal relation: reciprocal interaction is prior to efficient 
causality because the whole is given first.  Other causal relations within the 
whole depend on this reciprocal relationship, and individual objects or 
substances then arise as a result of these relations.  Schelling’s account of 
causality places this reciprocity at the heart of all casual relations, and bears a 
striking similarity to contemporary dispositional accounts of causation. 
One of Schelling’s central arguments against mechanistic conceptions of 
nature consists in his refutation of the claim that there is only one kind of 
causality in nature: efficient causality.  Schelling argues that this view of 
causation is unable to account for the kind of causality which characterises 
organic life, and therefore forces the mechanist into a reductive explanation of 
organisms.  Further, Schelling holds that the conception of causality as always 
and only efficient prevents the mechanist from conceiving of nature as an 
interrelated whole (which in turn entails that the mechanist’s conception of 
natural objects will always be impoverished as she is unable to understand 
them in terms of their relationships within this whole), as it implies that 
nature is composed of discrete isolated individuals whose only relations to one 
another are of active cause to passive effect.  The paradigm example of this 
kind of conception of causality is found in Kant’s second analogy,42 and for 
Schelling Kant’s order of priority in the analogies demonstrates not only the 
fundamental problems with conceiving of causality as always efficient, but 
also the mistaken reasoning about nature which leads to this conception. 
In the analogies Kant proceeds from the concept of substance to the 
concept of causality, and finally to the concept of community (reciprocal 
interaction) which is understood as a synthesis of the former two.  Schelling 
argues that Kant is unable to give a satisfactory account of community because 
his conceptions of substance and causality already entail a world of isolated 
individuals only related by efficient causal links: explaining reciprocal 
interaction between these individuals is therefore ruled out at the outset.  
However the concept of community is necessary for accounting for the fact 
that we always experience objects as part of a larger network of other objects – 
                                                 
42 Kant, 2007, A189/B232-A211/B256 
the fact that the world as a whole is an interconnected community of 
individuals – therefore Kant’s account falls short as it is unable to account for 
this fundamental aspect of the nature of objects. 
Schelling argues that the order of Kant’s analogies must be reversed: Kant 
made the mistake of conceiving of the relationship between substance, 
causality and community in accordance with the order of experience (i.e. in 
terms of the order in which subjects discover these concepts) rather than the 
order of existence.  Schelling argues that in fact community is foundational, 
and grounds both causal relations and substances rather than being a 
synthesis of the two.  This order of explanation is the only one that can make 
intelligible the existence of relations and connections throughout nature: 
reflecting his argument for the priority of force over matter Schelling argues 
that as community can explain causality and substance but the latter two 
cannot explain the former, community must therefore be prior.  In addition to 
this, giving priority to the community of substances better accounts for our 
experience of the world as an interconnected and unified whole. 43 
This implies the need to rethink our conception of causality as purely 
efficient: if objects are always in webs of reciprocal relationships with other 
objects, and with the whole, the idea of causality as a linear relationship 
between two discrete individuals in which one is the causal actor and one the 
passive patient becomes incoherent.  Schelling’s conception of causality thus 
places reciprocity at the centre of the causal relation.   
Schelling’s account of causation and the importance of reciprocal 
interaction becomes more intelligible if we consider it in the light of my 
interpretation of the Naturphilosophie as a power-based ontology.  On this 
reading reciprocity is central because the interaction of nature’s powers is 
ontologically primary: because the process through which forces interact is 
fundamental to nature, and because these forces always and only act in 
relationships with one another; reciprocal interaction between forces is 
therefore the primary causal relation.    This indicates why for Schelling it 
makes no sense to think of causation in efficient terms, as active cause and 
passive effect, because it always takes two (or more) powers working together 
for an effect to arise.  Thus there is activity on both sides of the causal relation, 
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as causation requires the mutual manifestation of complimentary 
dispositions.  Similarly my reading accounts for why, on Schelling’s 
conception, causes do not necessitate their effects: firstly, due to the reciprocal 
nature of the causal relation, to identify one power as cause and another as 
effect will not always be straightforward; and secondly, as causation requires 
the mutual action of powers it becomes unintelligible to say that one of these 
powers alone necessitated anything in the other.44  The idea that causes 
necessitate their effects comes from the mistaken conception of causes as fully 
active and effects as fully passive, which in turn rests on a conception of 
causation as only efficient and linear, which itself is based on a problematic 
world-view which sees reality as composed of inert and unconnected 
particulars which are moved to action by external forces.  This, of course, is 
the picture that Schelling’s analysis of matter urges us to reject in favour of an 
ontology which posits powers as fundamental.  
 
2.6 The Importance of Powers in the Naturphilosophie 
I have tried to show that the Naturphilosophie is best understood as a 
power-based ontology, arguing that on Schelling’s account nature is composed 
of active forces which combine in various ways to give rise to different natural 
products.  Before moving on I want to briefly make clear the centrality of 
Schelling’s power-based ontology to his Naturphilosophie.  I suggest that 
there are certain aspects of this account which are only made possible on the 
basis of his power-based ontology, as well as certain other aspects which draw 
heavily on the powers which underpin this system. 
Firstly, Schelling’s power-based ontology underlies his central claims 
regarding natural phenomena.  As we saw above, Schelling’s critiques of the 
mechanistic conception of nature draw heavily on his power-based ontology: 
his positive account of matter relies on a conception of opposed but mutually 
dependent powers; his arguments for the importance of reciprocal interaction 
in causality presuppose an account of causality as dispositional (because 
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reciprocal interaction between causes and effects only becomes intelligible 
when we conceive of this relationship in terms of two objects manifesting 
complimentary dispositions); and this in turn underlies his conception of the 
ends-based causality which defines not only natural organisms but also nature 
as a whole.  Schelling’s use of powers allows him to argue that nature is self-
governing and self-grounding: as nature is composed of fundamentally active 
powers there is no need to appeal to an animating principle or ground external 
to nature to account for its activity.   
Finally, Schelling’s power-based ontology enables him to have the 
particular conception of agents that is present in the Naturphilosophie.  The 
account of natural objects as arising from powers enables a conception of 
agents as fundamentally natural beings which emerge from the activity of 
natural powers.  Because of Schelling’s account of emergence (which I argued 
above is similarly dependent on his power-based ontology), he is also able to 
claim that there is something distinct and irreducible about agents: because 
there are certain powers (such as reason and self-consciousness) which only 
emerge at the level of the agent, agents are not reducible to the less complex 
natural powers from which they arise.  However, Schelling is still able to claim 
that consciousness and reason are not transcendent properties as they too are 
natural powers.  Schelling’s picture of nature as a dynamic, interconnected 
system, which entails the non-reducibility of the subjective to nature while 
maintaining a continuity between agents and other natural objects, is thus 
made possible by the fundamentality of powers in his ontology. 
 
3. Filling the Gaps 
 
From the above I hope it is becoming clear that Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie is useful for answering some of the questions that I argued 
remain for contemporary work which utilises the concept of power.  The 
Naturphilosophie provides a holistic account of nature which depends on 
taking powers in process as the fundamental ontological unit.  This ontology 
makes explicit how we could conceive of objects as composed of powers; the 
relationship of these objects to their causal powers (the emergence of objects 
comes with the emergence of a new set of powers; these objects and powers 
are then able to combine in various ways to give rise to larger objects); the 
emergence of subjectivity from nature; and demonstrates how powers-based 
accounts of causation and properties can be made intelligible as part of a 
wider ontology of powers.  
Schelling’s ontology also helps to make sense of why this power-based 
system is useful in terms of arguing for the existence of human freedom, 
something that there has been increasing interest in in the literature.45   
Firstly, the conception of objects as inherently powerful actors implies that the 
causal powers possessed by agents are fundamentally of the same kind as the 
causal powers possessed by other objects in the natural world.  This account 
allows for a conception of agents as simply a particular kind of natural 
product, arising from a distinctive combination of powers, and therefore has 
no need to introduce a dualism between the causality of agents and the 
causality of other natural products.  A distinctive advantage of a conception of 
human freedom derived from a power-based ontology lies in the fact that it 
has no need to argue that there is any incompatibility between agency and 
natural causality: this account allows us to be naturalists (broadly speaking) 
without denying the reality of human freedom.  Human agency can thus be 
seen both as consistent with, but also importantly distinct from, other kinds of 
natural causality: not distinct because agents possess a different kind of causal 
power to other natural products; but because of the distinctive combination of 
natural powers which constitute the makeup of agents.  Thus agents can be 
seen as natural products composed of a highly complex grouping of natural 
powers, which leads them to have highly generalised capacities with a wide 
range of possible manifestations.   
This account also entails that freedom can never be absolute: agents are 
part of a system which includes a great many other bearers of causal powers, 
thus the behaviour of agents will often be restricted by the activities of these 
other causal actors.  Thus this conception is able to account for both the causal 
force possessed by agents as well as the fact that this causal force is often 
limited by external circumstances.   
Despite these advantages, I now want to briefly point to a problem which 
arises for Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, and which I claim will arise for any 
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similar power-based view.   This is one of the ways that I want to show that 
Schelling’s work is of use in the contemporary debate: as well as providing a 
fully worked out power-based ontology, the Naturphilosophie also serves to 
highlight some problems (and possible solutions) which will arise for this kind 
of view. 
 
4. A Problem 
 
The problem I want to raise is a problem with individuation, which also 
entails a worry about the possibility of securing libertarian human freedom on 
this account46: if all objects are composed of smaller objects, which are 
themselves composed of powers, on what basis can we pick out objects from 
this mass of powers in process at all? 
This worry is a concern for Schelling in the Naturphilosophie, in particular 
in the Outline where he claims that it is the ‘highest problem’47 to be dealt 
with.  To see why the worry arises, consider Schelling’s likening of natural 
products to whirlpools: 
A stream flows in a straight line forward as long as it encounters no 
resistance.  Where there is resistance - a whirlpool forms.  Every original 
product of Nature is such a vortex, every organised being.  E.g., the 
whirlpool is not something immobilized, it is rather something 
constantly transforming – but reproduced anew at every moment.  Thus 
no product in Nature is fixed, but is reproduced at each instant.48 
 
On both the Naturphilosophie and the pan-dispositionalist view all natural 
products are analogous to whirlpools: both are the stable-looking 
manifestations of activity taking place in the thing of which they are a part; 
therefore neither is a genuine individual.  Although we might talk about the 
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47 Schelling, 2004, 77; SW III, 102 
48 Ibid. 18n 
whirlpool and the natural product as individuals, from a higher standpoint 
they are secondary to the activity which underlies them and which will 
eventually assimilate them again: in the case of the whirlpool, the river; in the 
case of finite beings, nature’s powers.   
Thus the problem arises: if everything is a manifestation of the activities of 
the same natural powers, how can we pick anything out of this mass of powers 
as a genuinely independent object?  Put another way, what is the salient 
feature that makes the whirlpool the relevant object rather than the water 
droplets which make it up; or the molecules which constitute the droplets; or 
the body of water as a whole? 
Let me say a little more about why this problem arises especially sharply for 
the pan-dispositionalist.  The central claim of this ontology is that the same 
things – natural powers – are operative at all levels of nature: the pan-
dispositionalist advocates an ontology of powers all the way down, which 
enter into relationships manifesting as stable objects.  Notice that the term 
object is used loosely here: in the above claim ‘object’ refers to any stable 
manifestation of powers in a relationship.  These objects could therefore be 
anything from an individual atom; a Lego brick; an anteater; a weather 
system; an angry mob; etc. Some of these objects are composed of smaller 
parts which are also objects in this broad sense: a human body is composed of 
particular organs, which themselves are composed of atoms; and this body is 
also capable of being part of larger objects, such as the aforementioned angry 
mob, or the ecosystem as a whole, for example.  A power-based ontology 
entails this kind of nesting: we have interactions of powers which manifest as 
objects; these objects interact with other powers; these interactions can be 
manifested as further objects; and so on.  On this ontology we have a variety of 
‘levels’ of objects of different sizes, all made up of smaller objects, all the way 
down until we reach the smallest ontological unit, the ungrounded power.  
The problem this creates, I suggest, is that this picture makes it difficult for us 
to give a principled account of how we pick out the causally or explanatorily 
relevant objects.  And this opens up a deeper worry: if we cannot give an 
account of how objects are individuated, then why talk about objects at all?  
Why not eliminate objects from our ontology in favour of the powers which 
constitute them? 
The problem also becomes more pronounced when the accounts we give of 
different levels of objects contradict each other.  For pragmatic reasons we 
might simply switch levels depending on our purposes, but this way of doing 
things falls short when our purposes include giving an accurate account of the 
causal processes which govern a system.  This is especially relevant in debates 
surrounding human freedom: we have one level of explanation which focuses 
on the agent and her decisions and actions etc., and another which focuses on 
the lower-level causal processes taking place within the agent’s body.  
Although both of these explanations alone may provide a useful account of the 
phenomena, when taken together they are contradictory as one posits the 
agent herself as the source of causal efficacy while the other claims this source 
is located in natural processes which take place below the level of the agent.  
This is especially problematic for the pan-dispositionalist as she must 
maintain that the agent and her parts are both manifestations of the same 
natural powers and processes: a claim which entails that both should be 
explainable within the same terms.  Therefore the option of holding that 
contradictory explanations of one and the same phenomena can be made 
intelligible by the adoption of different perspectives is not an option for the 
pan-dispositionalist, as one of the central claims of her ontology implies that 
these phenomena must admit of a single explanation.  The pan-
dispositionalist must rather provide an account of which of these levels (the 
agent or her parts, for example) is fundamental: an account of why it is that 
only one of these things counts as the causally relevant object. 
 
5. Solutions from the Naturphilosophie 
 
The worry I have been outlining has two parts: the first concerns how we 
can identify objects as genuine individuals given an ontology which entails 
that everything is simply a manifestation of powers in process.  The second 
arises after we identify individuals: once we have an account of the different 
kinds of objects that exist in the world we then need to give reasons for why 
we take the agent (and perhaps other objects on her ‘level’) to be causally or 
explanatorily relevant.  The first problem concerns reduction: why, on this 
ontology, do we talk of objects at all rather than reducing these to the powers 
which constitute them?  The second concerns explanation: in terms of what 
should we understand the processes which take place in nature?  This 
question appears straightforwardly epistemic, but has an ontological 
significance: it is not merely a question of how we should best understand the 
world, but rather a question of how the world itself should be understood.   
The first of these problems is not too worrying for the pan-dispositionalist, 
as there is nothing in this ontology which entails reductionism: just because 
objects are composed of powers this does not imply that they are reducible to 
powers.  This is demonstrated by the Naturphilosophie which claims that 
neither powers nor the objects which they give rise to have priority because 
the relationship between them is reciprocal.  For Schelling, nature can only 
express itself in something that it is not (infinite productivity manifested as 
finite product), the actualisation of nature’s powers depends on their being 
manifested in objects, therefore the ontological relationship of dependence 
between powers and objects is reciprocal: neither is reducible to the other.  
The pan-dispositionalist can therefore follow Schelling’s lead and maintain 
that although powers may be prior in terms of genesis (powers ‘produce’ 
objects in some sense) this does not afford them any ontological priority.   
The second problem is more difficult: although objects are not reducible to 
the powers which constitute them, we still need an account of why we take 
some objects to be reducible to their parts and certain objects to resist this 
kind of reduction.  For example, why is it that we take an angry mob to be 
explainable in terms of the agents which constitute it, but we do not take these 
agents to be explainable in terms of their underlying physical parts?   
For Schelling, this question is answered through his conception of 
organism, inspired by Kant’s account of organic wholes in the third Critique.49  
For Schelling, there is a certain kind of natural object which is different from 
others because of the particular relationship between the whole and its parts: 
although the parts make up the whole (the whole depends on its parts), the 
arrangement and interaction of these parts is determined by the concept of the 
whole (the parts depend on the whole); the relationship of dependence 
between the parts and whole is reciprocal.  These kinds of objects cannot be 
reduced to their parts because the whole itself plays an indispensable role in 
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structuring and ordering the parts: organisms are wholes which are greater 
than the sum of their parts, and they are therefore not reducible to these parts. 
This is what makes these objects the relevant ‘level’: they are neither reducible 
to their parts nor can they be assimilated into another object as its mere parts 
(and thus fail to be individuals) because they are a distinctive kind of whole; 
the kind that nature is disposed to produce as they are the kinds of objects 
which best exemplify the structure of nature itself.   
This account of the nature of organisms may seem unpalatable to the 
contemporary metaphysician for a number of reasons.  Firstly, Schelling’s 
account of organisms and of nature as a whole requires commitments to both 
essentialism and some form of teleology in the natural world.  This 
commitment to teleology is present on two levels in Schelling’s account: first 
because there is a particular kind of organism which nature is disposed to 
produce (teleology at the level of the whole); and second because on this 
account organisms each have a telos, a structuring concept which governs the 
arrangement of their parts (teleology at the level of the organism).  These 
claims about teleology in nature come hand in hand with a commitment to 
essentialism: an object’s telos flows from the essence of that object, i.e. from 
the nature of the particular kind of being that it is.  Schelling’s ontology thus 
accounts for why we take certain objects to be the relevant ones through his 
essentialism: there are certain natural objects which exemplify a particular 
kind of concept and are therefore not reducible to their parts, as the 
manifestation of the whole is what structures the behaviour of the parts rather 
than the other way round. 
Could the contemporary pan-dispositionalist use a similar solution to 
Schelling’s while avoiding some of these potentially unpalatable 
commitments?  The best option seems to be to focus on giving an account of 
the different kinds of part/whole relationships which exist in nature, as this 
could form the basis of the claim that agents are a particular kind of causally 
relevant whole and therefore cannot be explained in reductive terms.  This will 
involve a commitment to a number of other claims.  Firstly, the pan-
dispositionalist will require an account of emergence in order to maintain that 
new objects can arise from lower level interactions of powers.  Securing this 
claim should not be problematic as emergence is already built into her 
ontology in the claim that natural products arise from the interactions of 
powers.  However she will also need to provide a principled way of accounting 
for when a system counts as a new object in the causally relevant sense, which 
may prove more difficult.   
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